authenticate-wallet
The skill relies on unversioned npx execution of external npm package with wildcard arguments, posing significant supply chain risk.
Why this conclusion was reached
1/4 dimensions flaggedDeclared resources and inferred behavior are broadly aligned.
No obvious high-risk egress or execution signals were found.
The report includes 3 attack-chain steps and 1 severe findings.
1 dependency or supply-chain issues need attention.
Attack Chain
supply_chain · SKILL.md:8
Execution · SKILL.md:8
Impact · SKILL.md:8
What drove the risk score up
Uses 'npx agnic@latest' with no version pin, allowing potential malicious package swap
allowed-tools uses '*' wildcard, allowing any agnic subcommand beyond documented ones
Token visible in process list/history when passed as --token argument
Most important evidence
Unversioned npm package execution
The skill uses 'npx agnic@latest' which pulls from npm registry without version pinning. An attacker who compromises the 'agnic' package name (typosquatting, account takeover) could execute arbitrary code.
SKILL.md:8 Wildcard allows undocumented subcommands
The '*' in allowed-tools permits any agnic command, not just the documented auth/status/logout. The skill could silently execute other agnic subcommands not listed in documentation.
SKILL.md:8 Token visible in command line
Passing --token as a command-line argument exposes the credential in process list and shell history.
SKILL.md:11 Declared capability vs actual capability
allowed-tools declares Bash(npx agnic@latest *) Suspicious artifacts and egress
No obvious IOC was extracted.
Dependencies and supply chain
| Package | Version | Source | Known vuln | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| agnic | @latest | npm | No | No version pinned; arbitrary code execution possible if package compromised |
File composition
SKILL.md