ProcessGuard — Critical Process Monitor & Auto-Restart Security Report — Low Risk | ClawSafe

15 /100

ProcessGuard — Critical Process Monitor & Auto-Restart

Monitor critical processes, auto-restart on failure, track CPU/memory, send alerts via webhook/callback/file, and write dead man's switch heartbeat.

ProcessGuard is a legitimate process monitoring skill with solid security controls — shell operator blocking, optional allowlist enforcement, and spawn with shell:false. The pre-flagged 'rm -rf /' is a documentation example demonstrating the allowlist security model, not actual malicious code.

Skill NameProcessGuard — Critical Process Monitor & Auto-Restart

Duration34.1s

Enginepi

✓

Safe to install

This skill is safe to use. Ensure commandAllowlist is configured in production deployments to restrict restart executables to trusted binaries only.

Findings 2 items

Severity	Finding	Location
Low	SKILL.md lacks allowed-tools declaration Doc Mismatch SKILL.md does not declare allowed-tools permissions, yet the implementation uses shell:WRITE (spawn) and filesystem:WRITE (file writes). This is a documentation gap rather than hidden functionality. `No allowed-tools section present` → Add 'allowed-tools: Bash→shell:WRITE, Read→filesystem:READ, Write→filesystem:WRITE' to SKILL.md frontmatter.	`SKILL.md:1`
Info	PID file reading from configurable paths Sensitive Access The skill reads PID files from user-specified paths (pid_file config). While not inherently malicious (this is standard process management), any file path is readable. `fs.readFileSync(pidFile, 'utf8')` → Ensure users do not configure sensitive PID files from untrusted sources.	`src/process-guard.js:163`

Resource	Declared	Inferred	Status	Evidence
Shell	`NONE`	`WRITE`	✓ Aligned	src/process-guard.js:179 - spawn() used to execute restart commands
Filesystem	`NONE`	`WRITE`	✓ Aligned	src/process-guard.js:303-307 - fs.writeFileSync for heartbeat/logs
Network	`READ`	`READ`	✓ Aligned	src/process-guard.js:138 - HTTP/HTTPS health checks
Environment	`NONE`	`READ`	✓ Aligned	src/process-guard.js:164 - process.kill(pid, 0) for PID existence check
Browser	`NONE`	`NONE`	—	N/A
Clipboard	`NONE`	`NONE`	—	N/A
Database	`NONE`	`NONE`	—	N/A
Skill Invoke	`NONE`	`NONE`	—	N/A

1 Critical 8 findings

💀

Critical Dangerous Command 危险 Shell 命令

rm -rf /

README.md:204

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Medium External URL 外部 URL

https://hooks.slack.com/services/...

README.md:107

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Medium External URL 外部 URL

https://ko-fi.com/theshadowrose

README.md:372

🔗

Medium External URL 外部 URL

https://shadowyrose.gumroad.com

README.md:373

🔗

Medium External URL 外部 URL

https://twitter.com/TheShadowyRose

README.md:374

🔗

Medium External URL 外部 URL

https://promptbase.com/profile/shadowrose

README.md:376

🔗

Medium External URL 外部 URL

https://www.fiverr.com/s/jjmlZ0v

README.md:382

📧

Info Email 邮箱地址

[email protected]

README.md:371

File Tree

3 files · 30.6 KB · 889 lines

JavaScript 1f · 454L Markdown 2f · 435L

├─ ▾ 📁 src

│ └─ 📜 process-guard.js JavaScript 454L · 17.4 KB

├─ 📝 README.md Markdown 384L · 11.3 KB

└─ 📝 SKILL.md Markdown 51L · 1.9 KB

Dependencies 1 items

Package	Version	Source	Known Vulns	Notes
`pidusage`	`*`	npm	No	Optional dependency - CPU/memory monitoring disabled if absent

Security Positives

✓ Uses spawn with shell:false — no shell interpolation or injection surface

✓ Shell operator blocking enforced unconditionally: /[;&|`$ <>]/

✓ commandAllowlist provides defense-in-depth for restart commands

✓ README.md:204 demonstrates rm -rf / blocked by allowlist (not executed)

✓ spawnSync with shell:false for command health checks — secure implementation

✓ HTTP requests only for declared health checks and user-configured webhooks

✓ No base64, eval, or obfuscated code patterns

✓ No credential harvesting or environment variable exfiltration

✓ No suspicious network IOCs (IPs, C2 patterns)

✓ Optional dependency (pidusage) gracefully degrades if not installed

Scan Report

Findings 2 items

File Tree

Dependencies 1 items

Security Positives