低风险 — 风险评分 8/100
上次扫描:1 天前 重新扫描
8 /100
multi_call
多路召回skill,用于将意图识别结果分析后,通过向量知识库召回QA问答对,通过图数据库召回表的DDL结构
Legitimate multi-path recall skill for SQL generation. Uses Neo4j and Milvus for knowledge retrieval, with well-defined boundaries and documented external dependencies. No malicious behavior detected.
技能名称multi_call
分析耗时27.7s
引擎pi
可以安装
Approve for use. The skill only accesses declared workflow files and documented external services. No undeclared shell execution, credential harvesting, or data exfiltration.
资源类型声明权限推断权限状态证据
文件系统 READ READ ✓ 一致 multi_call.py:reads intent_output.json from .workflow/; index.js:reads .env
文件系统 WRITE WRITE ✓ 一致 multi_call.py:writes multicall_output.json to .workflow/
网络访问 READ READ ✓ 一致 multi_call.py:459; _RealMilvusQAService._vectorize calls dashscope.aliyuncs.com …
命令执行 NONE NONE No shell commands; only child_process.spawn for Python interpreter bridging
1 项发现
🔗
中危 外部 URL 外部 URL
https://dashscope.aliyuncs.com/compatible-mode/v1
multi_call.py:459

目录结构

3 文件 · 35.5 KB · 878 行
Python 1f · 690L JavaScript 1f · 136L Markdown 1f · 52L
├─ 📜 index.js JavaScript 136L · 4.7 KB
├─ 🐍 multi_call.py Python 690L · 28.7 KB
└─ 📝 SKILL.md Markdown 52L · 2.1 KB

依赖分析 4 项

包名版本来源已知漏洞备注
neo4j * pip Version not pinned; used only for database schema retrieval
pymilvus * pip Version not pinned; used for vector search
openai * pip Version not pinned; used for embeddings API (DashScope-compatible)
python-dotenv * pip Version not pinned; only reads local .env files

安全亮点

✓ All file I/O scoped to documented .workflow/ directory (intent_output.json → multicall_output.json)
✓ External service access (Neo4j/Milvus/DashScope) explicitly declared in SKILL.md .env table
✓ Dependency injection pattern isolates real service implementations from core logic
✓ Graceful degradation: Neo4j failure → default DDL, Milvus failure → empty QA list
✓ No credential harvesting — .env values used only for connecting to declared services
✓ No subprocess, curl|bash, or remote script execution
✓ No obfuscation, base64 payloads, or eval() calls
✓ No sensitive path access (~/.ssh, ~/.aws, .env exfiltration)
✓ No persistence mechanisms (no cron, startup hooks, or backdoors)
✓ No prompt injection or LLM prompt manipulation