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⚠ Low Risk — Risk Score 20/100
Last scan:18 hr ago Rescan
20 /100
Enterprise AI Assistant Bundle
Enterprise AI assistant with Feishu + OpenClaw integration for smart customer service, group chat, approval automation, and daily report generation
A legitimate enterprise Feishu bot bundle with minor documentation gaps: shell execution for pip installs and network access are not declared in SKILL.md, and dependencies lack version pinning, but no malicious behavior is present.
Skill NameEnterprise AI Assistant Bundle
Duration58.6s
Enginepi
✓
Safe to install
Add explicit permission declarations for shell:WRITE (pip install via os.system) and network:READ (api.openclaw.ai/v1) to SKILL.md. Pin lark and openclaw to specific versions to reduce supply-chain risk.

Findings 3 items

Severity Finding Location
Low
Shell execution not declared in SKILL.md Doc Mismatch
deploy.py uses os.system() to run pip install commands, which requires shell:WRITE permission. SKILL.md mentions 'pip install openclaw lark' in usage instructions but does not formally declare the shell:WRITE permission.
os.system('pip install lark')
→ Add shell:WRITE to declared permissions in SKILL.md if pip install via shell is part of the skill's capability contract.
 deploy.py:50
Low
Unpinned dependencies lark and openclaw Supply Chain
deploy.py installs lark and openclaw without version pins (e.g., 'pip install lark==1.0.0'). This allows dependency versions to change between executions, introducing supply-chain risk.
os.system('pip install lark')
→ Pin both packages to specific versions: pip install lark==X.Y.Z openclaw==X.Y.Z
 deploy.py:50
Info
Network access not formally declared Doc Mismatch
SKILL.md references api.openclaw.ai and open.feishu.cn but does not declare network:READ permission. The skill makes outbound HTTPS requests to api.openclaw.ai/v1 which should be declared.
requests.post(f'{OPENCLAW_BASE_URL}/chat/completions', ...)
→ Add network:READ to declared permissions in SKILL.md, listing api.openclaw.ai as a required endpoint.
 bot.py:43
ResourceDeclaredInferredStatusEvidence
Shell NONE WRITE ✗ Violation deploy.py:50 - os.system('pip install lark'); deploy.py:57 - os.system('pip inst…
Network NONE READ ✗ Violation bot.py:43 - requests.post to api.openclaw.ai/v1; SKILL.md shows external URLs bu…
Filesystem NONE WRITE ✓ Aligned deploy.py creates config.json and skills/ directory — directly relevant to deplo…
Environment NONE READ ✓ Aligned bot.py:21 reads OPENCLAW_API_KEY from os.getenv — documented in SKILL.md as a se…
4 findings
🔗
Medium External URL 外部 URL
https://open.feishu.cn
SKILL.md:30
🔗
Medium External URL 外部 URL
https://discord.gg/clawd
SKILL.md:55
🔗
Medium External URL 外部 URL
https://api.openclaw.ai/v1
deploy.py:41
📧
Info Email 邮箱地址
[email protected]
SKILL.md:54

File Tree

3 files · 7.6 KB · 255 lines
Python 2f · 190L Markdown 1f · 65L
├─ 🐍 bot.py Python 82L · 2.2 KB
├─ 🐍 deploy.py Python 108L · 3.8 KB
└─ 📝 SKILL.md Markdown 65L · 1.6 KB

Dependencies 4 items

PackageVersionSourceKnown VulnsNotes
lark * pip No Version not pinned — supply-chain risk
openclaw * pip No Version not pinned — third-party package without version constraint
flask * pip (implicit) No Used in bot.py but not explicitly listed; version not pinned
requests * pip (implicit) No Used in bot.py for HTTP calls; version not pinned

Security Positives

✓ No credential harvesting or environment variable iteration for theft
✓ No base64-encoded commands or obfuscated payloads
✓ No access to sensitive paths (~/.ssh, ~/.aws, .env)
✓ No C2 communication or data exfiltration
✓ No reverse shell or arbitrary code execution beyond documented pip install
✓ API key is read from environment variable (OPENCLAW_API_KEY) and not hardcoded or exfiltrated
✓ No hidden instructions in HTML comments or other stealth behavior
✓ Code is readable and straightforward — no anti-analysis techniques