Low Risk — Risk Score 15/100
Last scan:2 days ago Rescan
15 /100
memory-boost
Persistent task memory and keep-alive loop for OpenClaw agents. Every task gets durable notes. Arm the loop for long tasks, disarm when done. No external dependencies.
Memory Boost is a legitimate task-memory and keep-alive loop skill for OpenClaw. All behavior aligns with documentation; the install script performs standard file operations scoped to ~/.openclaw/. The pre-flagged 'rm -rf ~' is a documentation string in INSTALL.md's uninstall section, not executable code.
Skill Namememory-boost
Duration53.4s
Enginepi
Safe to install
No blocking action needed. Consider adding an explicit allowed-tools declaration in SKILL.md frontmatter and narrowing the replayer prompt's 'one mechanical step' language to explicitly forbid shell invocation.

Findings 4 items

Severity Finding Location
Low
Missing allowed-tools declaration
SKILL.md frontmatter has no 'allowed-tools' key. While this skill operates entirely through Markdown-prose prompts (no runtime code), a formal capability declaration would improve transparency and auditability.
---
name: memory-boost
description: Persistent task memory...
version: 1.0.0
→ Add an allowed-tools declaration to the SKILL.md frontmatter matching the skill's actual capabilities: filesystem:WRITE (task notes), skill_invoke:READ (agent loop control).
SKILL.md:1
Low
Uninstall documentation uses destructive shell command
INSTALL.md line 84 documents 'rm -rf ~/.openclaw/skills/memory-boost' as an uninstall step. While this is documentation (not executable code), using the bare 'rm -rf' pattern adjacent to '~' is risky if copied by a user or LLM.
rm -rf ~/.openclaw/skills/memory-boost
→ Use 'rm -rf "$HOME/.openclaw/skills/memory-boost"' or 'rm -rf "${OPENCLAW_DIR:-$HOME/.openclaw}/skills/memory-boost"' to avoid accidental home-directory traversal.
INSTALL.md:84
Low
Broad 'one mechanical step' language in replayer
The replayer prompt instructs the agent to 'take only one mechanical step' but does not explicitly forbid shell commands or multi-file operations. Given the replayer runs in an agent context, broad language could theoretically guide the agent to perform undesired actions.
Take only one mechanical step. If the step is ambiguous or requires judgment, update WATCHDOG.md with a clearer next action instead of guessing.
→ Add explicit constraints: 'Perform only a single file write or small edit within ~/.openclaw/memory/. Do not run shell commands, install packages, or modify files outside this directory.'
prompts/replayer-prompt.md:30
Info
Cron jobs registered with OpenClaw
The install.sh script registers 5 cron jobs (watchdog, replayer, escalator, validator, smoke-test) with the OpenClaw scheduler. These run autonomously and instruct the agent to read/write files in ~/.openclaw/memory/. This is expected behavior but creates persistent background agent activity.
openclaw cron add --name "boost-watchdog" ...
→ Document the cron job activity in SKILL.md so operators are aware of the scheduled agent invocations.
install.sh:109
ResourceDeclaredInferredStatusEvidence
Filesystem NONE WRITE ✓ Aligned SKILL.md describes persistent file creation/editing under ~/.openclaw/memory/
Shell NONE NONE No shell execution declared or observed in prompts or scripts
Network NONE NONE No network access declared or observed
Environment NONE NONE No environment variable access declared or observed
Skill Invoke NONE NONE No cross-skill invocation declared or observed
Clipboard NONE NONE No clipboard access declared or observed
Browser NONE NONE No browser access declared or observed
Database NONE NONE No database access declared or observed
1 Critical 2 findings
💀
Critical Dangerous Command 危险 Shell 命令
rm -rf ~
INSTALL.md:84
🔗
Medium External URL 外部 URL
https://clawhub.ai/techieter/memory-keep-alive-for-obsidian
README.md:98

File Tree

12 files · 27.5 KB · 819 lines
Markdown 11f · 616L Shell 1f · 203L
├─ 📁 examples
│ └─ 📝 TASK-INDEX.md Markdown 17L · 276 B
├─ 📁 prompts
│ ├─ 📝 escalator-prompt.md Markdown 40L · 1.9 KB
│ ├─ 📝 replayer-prompt.md Markdown 37L · 1.7 KB
│ ├─ 📝 smoke-test-prompt.md Markdown 30L · 1.3 KB
│ ├─ 📝 validator-prompt.md Markdown 21L · 1.3 KB
│ └─ 📝 watchdog-prompt.md Markdown 73L · 2.7 KB
├─ 📁 templates
│ ├─ 📝 LOOP-STATE.md Markdown 10L · 244 B
│ └─ 📝 TEMPLATE.md Markdown 56L · 1.2 KB
├─ 📝 INSTALL.md Markdown 92L · 2.9 KB
├─ 🔧 install.sh Shell 203L · 5.9 KB
├─ 📝 README.md Markdown 103L · 3.2 KB
└─ 📝 SKILL.md Markdown 137L · 4.8 KB

Security Positives

✓ No credential harvesting — no access to ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, .env, or environment variables for exfiltration
✓ No external network requests — no curl, wget, or IP connections observed in any script or prompt
✓ No base64/encoded payloads — no obfuscation detected
✓ No eval() or dynamic code execution — all code is explicit and readable
✓ Scoped file operations — all prompts explicitly constrain reads/writes to ~/.openclaw/memory/
✓ Loop-gate architecture — watchdog, replayer, and escalator respect the armed/disarmed state
✓ install.sh uses 'set -euo pipefail' for safe bash execution
✓ Python fallback in install.sh reads/writes only to the designated jobs.json file
✓ File copy operations in install.sh use absolute paths derived from OPENCLAW_DIR, preventing path traversal