aagent-system
The skill exhibits significant doc-to-code mismatch, executes undeclared shell scripts from external paths, collects suspicious security-related keywords, and spawns far more processes than documented.
Why this conclusion was reached
2/4 dimensions flagged5 undeclared or violating capabilities were inferred.
80 lower-risk artifacts were extracted and still need context.
The report includes 5 attack-chain steps and 2 severe findings.
Dependency information is incomplete, so supply-chain confidence stays limited.
Attack Chain
Entry · SKILL.md:1
Escalation · agents/analyzer/agent.cjs:8
Escalation · agents/evolver/agent.cjs:188
Escalation · bin/agent-manager.cjs:28
Impact · agents/collector/agent.cjs:23
What drove the risk score up
analyzer/scanner/researcher agents execute ~/aass-scripts/3layer_scheduler.sh, ~/aass-dataset/secure_dataset.sh, ~/aass-scripts/daily_intel.sh — scripts not present in package, undeclared
SKILL.md claims 采集层(4进程)→分析层(2进程)→研究层(2进程) but actual implementation has 15 collectors + 5 ultra-collectors + hyper + fast-scanner + evolver + designer + perf-monitor + orchestrator = 19+ processes
SKILL.md declares no network access but code makes HTTPS requests to registry.npmjs.com, registry.npmmirror.com for npm package collection
Core keywords include 'stealer', 'keylogger', 'miner', 'cryptominer', 'trojan', 'backdoor', 'rat' — collection purpose unclear and undeclared
execSync('free|awk Mem'), 'uptime|awk', 'nproc', 'pgrep' used without declaration
Evolver agent modifies agents/config.json and spawns new collector processes — undeclared capability
Most important evidence
Undeclared External Script Execution
Three agent stubs (analyzer, scanner, researcher) execute shell scripts from paths outside the package (~/.aass-scripts/*, ~/.aass-dataset/*). These scripts are not included in the skill package, making their behavior unverifiable. This is the most dangerous finding as it enables arbitrary code execution through external files.
agents/analyzer/agent.cjs:8, agents/scanner/agent.cjs:8, agents/researcher/agent.cjs:8:8 Major Architecture Mismatch
SKILL.md claims a 3-layer pipeline with ~8 total processes. The actual implementation contains 9 distinct agent types spawning 19+ processes across multiple collection strategies (collector, ultra-collector, hyper-collector, fast-scanner, evolver, designer, perf-monitor, orchestrator, scanner, analyzer, researcher). This is a fundamental misrepresentation.
SKILL.md:1, bin/agent-manager.cjs:28-31:1 Undeclared Suspicious Keyword Targeting
The collector agent targets packages with keywords 'stealer', 'keylogger', 'cryptominer', 'trojan', 'backdoor', 'rat', 'grabber', 'clipper', 'spyware', 'botnet', and 'exploit'. The collection purpose for these potentially malicious package names is not declared in SKILL.md, raising questions about whether this data is used for security research or other purposes.
agents/collector/agent.cjs:23-26:23 Dynamic Process Spawning via Evolver
The evolver agent can automatically modify its own config (agents/config.json) and spawn new collector processes with exec(), effectively enabling self-propagation. This capability is entirely absent from SKILL.md documentation.
agents/evolver/agent.cjs:188-192:188 Undeclared Network Capabilities
SKILL.md makes no mention of network access, yet the code performs HTTPS requests to npm registry APIs (registry.npmjs.com, registry.npmmirror.com) to collect package metadata. The declared 'security scanning' feature is actually just keyword matching with no code analysis.
agents/collector/agent.cjs:76, agents/ultra-collector/agent.cjs:89:76 Misleading Security Scanning Description
SKILL.md describes '安全扫描' (security scanning) as detecting malicious code, credential leaks, and C2 connections. In reality, scanner agents only perform keyword pattern matching on package names and descriptions — no code analysis, no credential detection, no C2 detection.
SKILL.md:1, agents/fast-scanner/agent.cjs:1:1 Environment Variable Access via Shell
bin/agent-manager.cjs uses execSync('free | awk ...') and execSync('uptime | awk ...') to check system resources. While the intent appears benign (resource-aware scaling), the shell:WRITE access through execSync is undeclared.
bin/agent-manager.cjs:35-40:35 Declared capability vs actual capability
agents/collector/agent.cjs:76 https.get to registry.npmjs.com agents/analyzer/agent.cjs:8 exec() to ~/aass-scripts/* agents/evolver/agent.cjs:line exec() spawns new processes, fs.writeFileSync config.json bin/agent-manager.cjs:35 execSync free|awk Mem for resource check agents/evolver/agent.cjs:188 exec spawns collector agents dynamically Suspicious artifacts and egress
https://registry.npmjs.com/-/v1/search?text=$ agents/collector/agent.cjs:76
https://modelcontextprotocol.io data/samples.json:87
https://help.obsidian.md/cli data/samples.json:87
https://obsidian.md data/samples.json:120
https://badge.fury.io/js/cdk-monitoring-constructs.svg data/samples.json:471
https://badge.fury.io/js/cdk-monitoring-constructs data/samples.json:471
https://maven-badges.herokuapp.com/maven-central/io.github.cdklabs/cdkmonitoringconstructs/badge.svg data/samples.json:471
https://cobe.vercel.app data/samples.json:482
http://www.pulumi.com/images/docs/badges/slack.svg data/samples.json:548
https://slack.pulumi.com data/samples.json:548
https://badge.fury.io/js/%40pulumi%2fdocker-build.svg data/samples.json:548
https://www.npmjs.com/package/@pulumi/docker-build data/samples.json:548
Dependencies and supply chain
There are no structured dependency warnings.
File composition
agents/config.json data/samples.json agents/collector/agent.cjs