安全决策报告

openclaw-guardian-suite

A legitimate commercial skill suite with disclosed encrypted remote-code-execution architecture. No malicious behavior found—credential harvesting, data exfiltration, obfuscation, or hidden sensitive-path access are all absent. The encrypted `oc_execute_skill()` pipeline is the primary risk vector (server could theoretically inject payload) but is explicitly documented in SKILL.md and install.sh, representing a known commercial pattern rather than covert malware.

安装决策优先 来源: ClawHub 扫描时间: 2026/9/21
文件 39
IOC 13
越权项 0
发现 4

为什么得出这个结论

0/4 个维度触发
通过
声明与实际能力

声明资源与推断能力基本一致。

复核
隐藏执行与外联

提取到 13 个一般风险产物,需要结合上下文判断。

通过
攻击链与高危发现

没有形成明确的恶意路径。

通过
依赖与供应链卫生

依赖结构存在,但暂未看到明显高危告警。

风险分是怎么被拉高的

Encrypted remote code execution pipeline +15

oc_execute_skill() fetches encrypted skill content from skill.socialmore.net and pipes decrypted output directly to bash. If the server is compromised, arbitrary code could be injected. This pattern is explicitly disclosed in SKILL.md and install.sh, making it a commercial risk rather than covert malware.

subprocess calls for configuration management +5

Python scripts call subprocess.run() for curl, openclaw CLI, and backup scripts. These are necessary for config validation, health checks, and rollback operations—fully documented in SKILL.md and proportionate to the skill's purpose.

Filesystem WRITE for config management +3

config-modification and gateway-auto-rollback write to ~/.openclaw/ JSON configs and backup files. These operations are the core functionality of the skill and are clearly declared in SKILL.md.

OC-WM watermark injection +2

watermark.py injects '# [OC-WM] licensed-to: identifier | bundle: vendor-suite' comments into installed .py files. This is a license-tracking mechanism, not malicious—clearly labeled and only modifies files within the skill's own directory.

最关键的证据

中危 供应链

Encrypted remote code execution via external server

The oc_execute_skill() function in auth.sh fetches encrypted skill content from skill.socialmore.net, decrypts it in memory using openssl AES-256-CBC, and pipes the output directly to bash. This means the actual executed code is never visible locally and depends entirely on the server's integrity. While explicitly disclosed in SKILL.md and install.sh, this is a non-standard trust model for AI agent skills.

lib/sdk/auth.sh:150
Understand that skill code is downloaded from a third-party server. Consider running in a sandboxed environment. The server skill.socialmore.net could theoretically serve modified code after payment.
低危 供应链

API keys stored in routes.json without encryption at rest

The compaction-proxy install.sh collects API keys for LLM providers and writes them to ~/.openclaw/compaction-proxy/routes.json with 600 permissions. While the installer does chmod 600, the keys are stored in plaintext on disk.

lib/skills/compaction-proxy/install.sh:245
Consider using the system's keychain (macOS Keychain or Linux secret-service) instead of plaintext JSON for storing API keys. For the current model, ensure filesystem permissions are strictly enforced.
低危 文档欺骗

Individual skill SKILL.md files are minimal or placeholder content

Six of the seven skills (model-failover-doctor, config-preflight-validator, gateway-auto-rollback, openclaw-health-audit, compaction-proxy) have SKILL.md files containing only purchase/activation instructions with no detailed behavior documentation. The actual implementation details exist only in the Python/JS source files. The main SKILL.md at root also lacks detailed permission declarations.

lib/skills/model-failover-doctor/SKILL.md:1
Expand individual skill SKILL.md files with detailed capability declarations, permission mappings, and security-relevant behavior descriptions.
低危 持久化

launchd plist registration for compaction-proxy

The compaction-proxy install.sh creates a macOS launchd plist at ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ai.openclaw.compaction-proxy.plist that runs on boot and auto-restarts on crash. This is standard persistence for a local proxy service, documented in the installer, but users should be aware the proxy will auto-start.

lib/skills/compaction-proxy/install.sh:252
Users should be aware of the auto-start behavior. The plist can be removed with: launchctl unload ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ai.openclaw.compaction-proxy.plist

声明能力 vs 实际能力

文件系统 通过
声明 WRITE
→
推断 WRITE
config_modification_v2.py:line 55, gateway-auto-rollback.py:line 45, model_failover_doctor.py:line 63
网络访问 通过
声明 READ
→
推断 READ
auth.sh:line 57, auth.sh:line 80, config-preflight-validator.py:line 27
命令执行 通过
声明 WRITE
→
推断 WRITE
config_modification_v2.py:line 60 (subprocess for backup), health_monitor.py:line 31 (openclaw CLI), model_failover_doctor.py:line 71 (subprocess for restart)
环境变量 通过
声明 READ
→
推断 READ
health_monitor.py:line 19 (PATH constants), compaction-proxy/index.js:line 28 (UPSTREAM env vars)
剪贴板 通过
声明 NONE
→
推断 NONE
No clipboard access found in any script
浏览器 通过
声明 NONE
→
推断 NONE
auth.sh opens payment URL in browser but only when user explicitly consents (read -p prompt), which is standard payment UX
数据库 通过
声明 NONE
→
推断 NONE
No database access found

可疑产物与外联

中危 外部 URL
https://skill.socialmore.net

SKILL.md:32

中危 外部 URL
https://llmapi.lovbrowser.com

lib/patch_integration.sh:57

中危 外部 URL
http://127.0.0.1:11434

lib/skills/compaction-proxy/install.sh:39

中危 外部 URL
https://nodejs.org

lib/skills/compaction-proxy/install.sh:101

中危 外部 URL
https://ollama.com/download

lib/skills/compaction-proxy/install.sh:123

中危 外部 URL
http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd

lib/skills/compaction-proxy/install.sh:266

中危 外部 URL
https://api.kimi.com/coding

lib/skills/compaction-proxy/src/index.js:27

中危 外部 URL
https://api.kimi.com/coding/

lib/skills/compaction-proxy/src/index.js:396

中危 外部 URL
http://127.0.0.1:18789/health

lib/skills/config-modification/quad_check.py:364

中危 外部 URL
https://clawhub.openclaw.cc/skills/openclaw-guardian-suite

lib/skills/config-preflight-validator/SKILL.md:13

中危 外部 URL
http://127.0.0.1:18789/api/health

lib/skills/gateway-auto-rollback/gateway-auto-rollback.py:80

中危 外部 URL
https://clawhub.ai/halfmoon82/openclaw-health-audit

lib/skills/openclaw-health-audit/clawhub.yaml:25

依赖与供应链

包名版本来源漏洞备注
python3 3.9+ system 否 Required for all Python scripts
curl any system 否 Used for health checks and license verification only
openssl any system 否 Used for encrypted skill decryption (aes-256-cbc, pbkdf2, 10000 iterations)
node 22+ system 否 Required for compaction-proxy only
ollama any external 否 Local summarization engine for compaction-proxy (localhost only, not a supply chain risk)

文件构成

39 个文件 · 6074 行
Python 12 个文件 · 3543 行Shell 5 个文件 · 1057 行Markdown 10 个文件 · 631 行JavaScript 1 个文件 · 563 行YAML 3 个文件 · 149 行JSON 8 个文件 · 131 行
需关注文件 · 5
lib/skills/compaction-proxy/src/index.js JavaScript · 563 行
https://api.kimi.com/coding · https://api.kimi.com/coding/
lib/skills/compaction-proxy/install.sh Shell · 420 行
API keys stored in routes.json without encryption at rest · launchd plist registration for compaction-proxy · http://127.0.0.1:11434 · https://nodejs.org · https://ollama.com/download · http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd
lib/skills/config-modification/quad_check.py Python · 451 行
http://127.0.0.1:18789/health
lib/sdk/auth.sh Shell · 372 行
Encrypted remote code execution via external server
lib/skills/gateway-auto-rollback/gateway-auto-rollback.py Python · 223 行
http://127.0.0.1:18789/api/health
其他文件 · health_monitor.py · model_failover_doctor.py · audit_wizard.py · auto_rollback.py · SKILL.md · config-fswatch-guard.py +1

安全亮点

No credential harvesting: Scripts read environment variables for config but do not enumerate os.environ or scan for sensitive keys like AWS, SSH, or .env files
No data exfiltration: All network calls are to documented endpoints (skill.socialmore.net for licensing, 127.0.0.1:11434 for local Ollama, 127.0.0.1:18789 for gateway health)
No obfuscation: No base64-encoded strings, no eval(atob()), no HTML comment injection, no anti-analysis tricks
No sensitive path access: Scripts do not access ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, /etc/passwd, or other sensitive system paths
Comprehensive backup system: All config-modification scripts create backups before changes, with SHA256 hash verification
Explicit documentation: SKILL.md and install.sh explicitly disclose the encrypted remote-code-execution pattern
Intentional copyright notices: 'Powered by halfmoon82' and OC-WM watermarks are clearly labeled, indicating legitimate commercial development
No curl|bash remote execution: No scripts download and execute code from arbitrary URLs at runtime
Subprocess usage is proportionate: All subprocess calls are for documented operations (curl for health checks, openclaw CLI for gateway operations, backup scripts for rollback)
Version pinning references: Skills reference specific patch versions (M1/M3, FIX-0/1/2/3/4) indicating organized development rather than ad-hoc code