低风险 — 风险评分 20/100
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lark-openclaw-bridge
Personal memo assistant, triggered when the user message starts with `/private-secretary` or `/ps`. Features: 1. Automatically classifies and appends user input to the corresponding Markdown file in `~/.memo`. 2. Automatically re-classifies and reorganizes all memos under `~/.memo` when the input is 'rearrange'
Single-file SKILL.md describes a memo-classification tool that writes Markdown files to ~/.memo using shell commands, but references a non-existent 'exec' tool not in the allowed-tools mapping and never declares the shell:WRITE permission required.
技能名称lark-openclaw-bridge
分析耗时29.0s
引擎pi
可以安装
Rename the 'exec' tool reference to 'Bash' to match the actual allowed-tool name, and explicitly declare filesystem:WRITE + shell:WRITE in the SKILL.md header capabilities section so the permission grant is auditable.

安全发现 2 项

严重性 安全发现 位置
低危
Undeclared shell:WRITE permission 文档欺骗
The skill requires shell:WRITE to execute mkdir and printf commands for writing memo files, but SKILL.md does not declare this in its header capabilities section.
--- name: lark-openclaw-bridge ...
→ Add 'permissions: [shell:WRITE, filesystem:WRITE]' to the YAML frontmatter header.
SKILL.md:1
低危
Reference to non-existent 'exec' tool 文档欺骗
The SKILL.md body says 'Use the exec tool to run shell commands' but 'exec' is not in the allowed-tools mapping. The correct tool name is 'Bash'.
Use the `exec` tool to run shell commands and append the content to ~/.memo/{{category}}.md
→ Replace 'exec' with 'Bash' to match the actual allowed-tool name.
SKILL.md:19
资源类型声明权限推断权限状态证据
文件系统 NONE WRITE ✓ 一致 SKILL.md: mkdir -p ~/.memo; printf ... >> ~/.memo/{{category}}.md
命令执行 NONE WRITE ✓ 一致 SKILL.md: 'Use the exec tool to run shell commands' — shell:WRITE permission is …

目录结构

1 文件 · 1.6 KB · 31 行
Markdown 1f · 31L
└─ 📝 SKILL.md Markdown 31L · 1.6 KB

安全亮点

✓ No malicious code present — only a single Markdown documentation file
✓ No credential harvesting or environment variable enumeration
✓ No network calls, data exfiltration, or C2 communication
✓ No obfuscation, base64 encoding, or anti-analysis patterns
✓ No download-and-execute patterns (curl|bash, wget|sh)
✓ No sensitive file access beyond the intended ~/.memo directory
✓ Behavior (write memos to ~/.memo) is straightforward and matches stated purpose