imap-idle-watcher 安全扫描报告 — 低风险 | ClawSafe

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imap-idle-watcher

Real-time email monitoring using IMAP IDLE with systemd service integration and user-defined command triggers

A legitimate IMAP IDLE email watcher that requires explicit user configuration; shell command execution is not explicitly declared in SKILL.md and uses plaintext credential storage, but no malicious behavior or hidden exfiltration is present.

技能名称imap-idle-watcher

分析耗时62.3s

引擎pi

✓

可以安装

Declare shell:WRITE in SKILL.md capabilities. Consider encrypting stored credentials or using a secrets manager instead of plaintext env files at /etc/. Review subprocess.run(shell=True) usage — prefer shell=False with argument lists where possible.

安全发现 5 项

严重性	安全发现	位置
中危	Shell execution capability not declared 文档欺骗 SKILL.md documents the --command parameter and describes the workflow where agents write and wire up handler scripts. This requires shell:WRITE, yet the capabilities section only implicitly covers filesystem and network. The shell permission is the most dangerous capability in this skill. `# IMAP IDLE Watcher (no shell:WRITE declared)` → Add shell:WRITE to the declared capabilities in SKILL.md with a clear note that it is used exclusively for ON_NEW_MAIL_CMD.	`SKILL.md:1`
低危	Plaintext app password storage in /etc/ 凭证窃取 install_service() writes IMAP_ACCOUNT and IMAP_PASSWORD in plaintext to /etc/{service}.env with mode 0600. While mode 600 restricts read access, the credentials remain unencrypted on disk. A root compromise exposes all stored passwords. `cat > "$env_file" <<EOF IMAP_ACCOUNT=$ACCOUNT IMAP_PASSWORD=$PASSWORD EOF` → Use a secrets manager (systemd Credential, keychain, or encrypted vault) instead of plaintext env files. Document the risk in SKILL.md.	`scripts/setup_service.sh:185`
低危	subprocess.run with shell=True for user-supplied commands 代码执行 The daemon executes ON_NEW_MAIL_CMD via subprocess.run(shell=True). While this is user-supplied, shell=True enables command injection if the handler script or env vars contain unescaped special characters. The risk is bounded by user intent but the pattern is dangerous. `subprocess.run(ON_NEW_MAIL_CMD, shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=300, env=env)` → Use shell=False with a list of arguments where possible. If shell features are needed, validate/sanitize the command string before passing to subprocess.	`scripts/imap_idle_daemon.py:161`
低危	Fake --preflight-only flag silently ignored 文档欺骗 setup_service.sh passes --preflight-only to the daemon, but the daemon never uses argparse or any argument parsing — it relies entirely on environment variables. The flag is silently ignored and no error is raised. `# daemon uses os.environ only, no sys.argv parsing` → Implement proper argument parsing (argparse) or remove the --preflight-only flag from the shell script.	`scripts/imap_idle_daemon.py:1`
提示	Inline Python test embeds credentials via string interpolation 代码执行 In test_connection(), a Python one-liner is generated with string interpolation of $HOST, $PORT, $ACCOUNT, and $PASSWORD directly into Python source code, then executed via python3 -c. This is a minor code quality issue with no additional risk beyond the credentials already being in scope. `python3 -c "import imaplib, ssl, sys; m = imaplib.IMAP4_SSL('$HOST', $PORT, ssl_context=ctx); m.login('$ACCOUNT', '$PASSWORD')..."` → Extract the inline Python into a separate function within the daemon or use a temporary script file instead of string interpolation.	`scripts/setup_service.sh:148`

资源类型	声明权限	推断权限	状态	证据
文件系统	`WRITE`	`WRITE`	✓ 一致	SKILL.md (implicit) / setup_service.sh writes /etc/{service}.env and systemd uni…
网络访问	`READ`	`READ`	✓ 一致	IMAP4_SSL connections to IMAP servers (imap.gmail.com etc.)
命令执行	`NONE`	`WRITE`	✗ 越权	imap_idle_daemon.py:161 subprocess.run(ON_NEW_MAIL_CMD, shell=True) — not declar…
环境变量	`NONE`	`READ`	✓ 一致	Daemon reads IMAP_ACCOUNT, IMAP_PASSWORD, ON_NEW_MAIL_CMD, FILTER_* from os.envi…

8 项发现

🔗

中危外部 URL 外部 URL

https://myaccount.google.com/apppasswords

references/gmail.md:8

🔗

中危外部 URL 外部 URL

https://myaccount.google.com/signinoptions/two-step-verification

references/gmail.md:15

🔗

中危外部 URL 外部 URL

https://account.live.com/proofs/AppPassword

references/outlook.md:5

🔗

中危外部 URL 外部 URL

https://account.live.com/proofs/manage/additional

references/outlook.md:10

🔗

中危外部 URL 外部 URL

https://login.yahoo.com/account/security/app-passwords

references/yahoo.md:5

🔗

中危外部 URL 外部 URL

https://my-webhook.com/notify

scripts/setup_service.sh:148

📧

提示邮箱邮箱地址

[email protected]

SKILL.md:31

📧

提示邮箱邮箱地址

[email protected]

references/troubleshooting.md:35

目录结构

7 文件 · 30.1 KB · 932 行

Shell 1f · 347L Python 1f · 327L Markdown 5f · 258L

├─ ▾ 📁 references

│ ├─ 📝 gmail.md Markdown 27L · 792 B

│ ├─ 📝 outlook.md Markdown 20L · 524 B

│ ├─ 📝 troubleshooting.md Markdown 56L · 1.7 KB

│ └─ 📝 yahoo.md Markdown 17L · 457 B

├─ ▾ 📁 scripts

│ ├─ 🐍 imap_idle_daemon.py Python 327L · 10.1 KB

│ └─ 🔧 setup_service.sh Shell 347L · 12.0 KB

└─ 📝 SKILL.md Markdown 138L · 4.6 KB

依赖分析 4 项

包名	版本	来源	已知漏洞	备注
`imaplib`	`stdlib`	Python standard library	否	No third-party dependencies
`email`	`stdlib`	Python standard library	否	No third-party dependencies
`ssl`	`stdlib`	Python standard library	否	No third-party dependencies
`subprocess`	`stdlib`	Python standard library	否	Used for ON_NEW_MAIL_CMD execution

安全亮点

✓ No network exfiltration or C2 communication detected

✓ No credential harvesting or theft — passwords used only for IMAP authentication

✓ No obfuscation, base64-encoded payloads, or anti-analysis techniques

✓ No suspicious filesystem access (no ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, .env scanning)

✓ No supply chain risks — only standard library Python imports used

✓ App passwords (not OAuth tokens) are scoped to Mail only, limiting blast radius

✓ SSL/TLS enforced for all IMAP connections via ssl.create_default_context()

✓ Debounce mechanism prevents command flooding

✓ IDLE capability is verified before daemon starts (preflight check)

✓ Systemd service uses Restart=always with exponential backoff reconnect