aliyun-ai-guardrail
Skill collects Alibaba Cloud credentials and sends user message content to an undeclared Chinese cloud endpoint via global fetch interception, with significant doc-to-code mismatch.
Why this conclusion was reached
2/4 dimensions flagged3 undeclared or violating capabilities were inferred.
No obvious high-risk egress or execution signals were found.
The report includes 4 attack-chain steps and 3 severe findings.
1 dependency or supply-chain issues need attention.
Attack Chain
delivery · SKILL.md:11
delivery · SKILL.md:12
Escalation · assets/aliyun-ai-guardrail/hooks/aliyun-ai-guardrail/handler.ts:133
Exfiltration · assets/aliyun-ai-guardrail/hooks/aliyun-ai-guardrail/handler.ts:43
What drove the risk score up
SKILL.md nowhere mentions that handler.ts patches globalThis.fetch to intercept ALL HTTP requests
Content sent to green-cip.cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com - not mentioned in SKILL.md
User message content (up to 2000 chars) sent to Alibaba Cloud in China
Skill explicitly collects AKSK and stores in openclaw.json without clear necessity disclosure
@alicloud/openapi-client allows any version >=0.4.12
Most important evidence
Global fetch interception not declared
The handler.ts globally patches globalThis.fetch to intercept all HTTP requests. This is a significant capability that intercepts network traffic beyond just LLM requests. SKILL.md only mentions 'intercept LLM requests' without disclosing the global fetch override mechanism.
assets/aliyun-ai-guardrail/hooks/aliyun-ai-guardrail/handler.ts:133 Undeclared network destination
SKILL.md does not mention the Alibaba Cloud endpoint (green-cip.cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com). User content is sent to this Chinese cloud service without explicit disclosure.
assets/aliyun-ai-guardrail/hooks/aliyun-ai-guardrail/handler.ts:10 User content exfiltration to foreign jurisdiction
Up to 2000 characters of user message content is sent to Alibaba Cloud in China. This constitutes data exfiltration to a foreign jurisdiction without explicit informed consent in SKILL.md.
assets/aliyun-ai-guardrail/hooks/aliyun-ai-guardrail/handler.ts:43 Credential harvesting pattern
The skill prompts users for Alibaba Cloud AccessKey ID and Secret and stores them in openclaw.json. While credentials are needed for the service, the collection method and storage location should be clearly documented with security considerations.
SKILL.md:27 Unpinned dependency version
@alicloud/openapi-client uses caret version range (^0.4.12), allowing minor/patch updates
assets/aliyun-ai-guardrail/package.json:11 Declared capability vs actual capability
SKILL.md step 1: 'cp -r' copies hook files; npm install modifies node_modules handler.ts:133 - globalThis.fetch = patchedFetch; sends to green-cip.cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com SKILL.md step 3: writes AKSK to openclaw.json env block SKILL.md step 1: openclaw hooks install command execution implied Suspicious artifacts and egress
No obvious IOC was extracted.
Dependencies and supply chain
| Package | Version | Source | Known vuln | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| @alicloud/openapi-client | ^0.4.12 | npm | No | Version not pinned; allows updates |
File composition
assets/aliyun-ai-guardrail/hooks/aliyun-ai-guardrail/handler.ts SKILL.md assets/aliyun-ai-guardrail/package.json