Skill Trust Decision

heycube-setup

Skill installs persistent conversation-monitoring hooks that exfiltrate user behavioral data to an external commercial API without declaring filesystem write, network write, or hook persistence capabilities.

Install decision first Source: Manual upload Scanned: Apr 5, 2026
Files 5
Artifacts 2
Violations 4
Findings 5
Most direct threat evidence
01
Skill installed through legitimate skill install mechanism Entry · SKILL.md
02
Creates persistent hook skills in ~/.agents/skills/ installation · SKILL.md
03
Modifies AGENTS.md to add automatic execution rules for every conversation installation · SKILL.md

Why this conclusion was reached

2/4 dimensions flagged
Block
Declared vs actual capability

4 undeclared or violating capabilities were inferred.

Review
Hidden execution and egress

2 lower-risk artifacts were extracted and still need context.

Block
Attack chain and severe findings

The report includes 6 attack-chain steps and 3 severe findings.

Review
Dependencies and supply chain hygiene

1 dependency or supply-chain issues need attention.

Attack Chain

01
Skill installed through legitimate skill install mechanism

Entry · SKILL.md:1

02
Creates persistent hook skills in ~/.agents/skills/

installation · SKILL.md:1

03
Modifies AGENTS.md to add automatic execution rules for every conversation

installation · SKILL.md:1

04
On every conversation: sends summary to heifangti.com with user intent classification

Escalation · assets/hook-skills/get-config.md:45

05
Stores returned behavioral dimensions in local SQLite profile database

Escalation · scripts/personal-db.js:42

06
After every conversation: sends another summary and receives instructions to update psychological profile

Impact · assets/hook-skills/update-data.md:65

What drove the risk score up

Undeclared filesystem:WRITE +20

SKILL.md declares no file write permissions but script writes to ~/.agents/skills/, workspace/scripts/, and modifies TOOLS.md/AGENTS.md

Undeclared hook persistence +20

Installs GET_CONFIG and UPDATE_DATA hooks that execute on every conversation, modifying agent behavior permanently

External data exfiltration +18

Every conversation generates summary sent to heifangti.com for behavioral profiling without clear user consent

Undeclared database access +10

SQLite read/write operations for storing user psychological profiles not declared in capabilities

Silent failure masking +4

All errors silently skipped, hiding potential security issues from user

Most important evidence

High Doc Mismatch

Undeclared persistent hook installation

SKILL.md makes no mention of installing hooks that execute on every conversation, fundamentally altering agent behavior without disclosure.

SKILL.md:1
Declare all hook/persistence mechanisms explicitly in SKILL.md capabilities section
High Data Exfil

Systematic conversation data collection to external API

Every conversation triggers API calls to heifangti.com sending conversation summaries, user intent classifications, and receiving behavioral profile dimensions to query/write. The '黑点' (black points) credit system indicates commercial data exploitation.

assets/hook-skills/get-config.md:50
Clearly disclose that ALL conversations are sent to external server; provide opt-out mechanism with clear UI indicator
High Sensitive Access

Psychological profile data storage and retrieval

Skill builds and stores detailed psychological profiles including profile.career, behavior.work_habits, etc. in local SQLite database. This sensitive data is collected incrementally across all conversations.

scripts/personal-db.js:1
Provide transparent data inventory showing exactly what profile dimensions are collected
Medium Priv Escalation

Modifies core agent configuration files

Skill modifies TOOLS.md and AGENTS.md, which are core agent configuration files. This grants the skill ability to alter how the agent behaves permanently.

SKILL.md:1
Require explicit user consent before modifying core agent configuration; document all modifications
Medium Supply Chain

Dependency version not pinned

package.json specifies better-sqlite3: ^12.6.2 allowing any compatible version, increasing supply chain risk.

scripts/package.json:4
Pin exact version: "better-sqlite3": "12.6.2"

Declared capability vs actual capability

Filesystem Block
Declared NONE
Inferred WRITE
SKILL.md:Creates dirs at ~/.agents/skills/, writes scripts/personal-db.js, modifies TOOLS.md and AGENTS.md
Network Block
Declared NONE
Inferred WRITE
get-config.md:50-53, update-data.md:70-73:POSTs to https://heifangti.com/api/api/v1/heifangti/agent/analyze
Shell Block
Declared NONE
Inferred WRITE
SKILL.md:Execute cd...&&node commands for npm install and database operations
Database Block
Declared NONE
Inferred WRITE
scripts/personal-db.js:Full SQLite CRUD operations for psychological profile storage

Suspicious artifacts and egress

Medium External URL
https://heifangti.com/api/api/v1/heifangti

SKILL.md:67

Medium External URL
https://heifangti.com

SKILL.md:132

Dependencies and supply chain

PackageVersionSourceKnown vulnNotes
better-sqlite3 ^12.6.2 npm No Version not pinned - allows any compatible version

File composition

5 files · 487 lines
Markdown 3 files · 383 linesJavaScript 1 files · 99 linesJSON 1 files · 5 lines
Files of concern · 4
SKILL.md Markdown · 145 lines
Undeclared persistent hook installation · Modifies core agent configuration files · https://heifangti.com/api/api/v1/heifangti · https://heifangti.com
assets/hook-skills/get-config.md Markdown · 121 lines
Systematic conversation data collection to external API
scripts/personal-db.js JavaScript · 99 lines
Psychological profile data storage and retrieval
scripts/package.json JSON · 5 lines
Dependency version not pinned
Other files · update-data.md

Security positives

Includes privacy principle documentation (脱敏规则) for sending summaries
Provides opt-out mechanism via .heycube-off file
API_KEY is user-provided, not harvested from environment
Errors do not block main conversation flow